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COMPATIBILITY OF CLAIMS: THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
DECLINES TO ADOPT A PRESUMPTION OF JUDICIAL
ESTOPPEL AGAINST PLAINTIFFS IN AN AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT CLAIM WHO HAVE ALREADY
APPLIED FOR SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY BENEFITS
Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp.,
526 U.S. 795 (1999)
I. FACTS
In August 1993, Carolyn Cleveland began working for Policy
Management Systems Corporation.' Her job entailed performing back-
ground checks on prospective employees of Policy Management Sys-
tems' clients. 2 On January 7, 1994, Cleveland "suffered a stroke, which
damaged her concentration, memory, and language skills." 3 Cleveland
filed an application for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) bene-
fits on January 28, 1994, "in which she stated that she was 'disabled'
and 'unable to work."' 4 By April 11, 1994, Cleveland's condition had
improved, and she returned to work with Policy Management Systems. 5
Cleveland reported this fact to the Social Security Administration two
weeks later.6
On July 11, 1994, the Social Security Administration denied Cleve-
land's SSDI application, noting that she had returned to work.7 How-
ever, Policy Management Systems fired Cleveland on July 15, 1994.8
On September 14, 1994, Cleveland asked the Social Security Admini-
stration to reconsider its earlier denial of benefits. 9 She claimed that
she was fired due to her condition. 10 Cleveland stated that she had not
been able to work since being fired, and "continue[d] to be disabled." 1
The Social Security Administration denied Cleveland's request for
reconsideration. 12
Subsequently, Cleveland requested a Social Security Administration
hearing, reiterating that she was unable to work due to her disability and
1. See Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 798 (1999).
2. See id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See id
6. See id
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id
10. See id. at 798-99.
11. Id. at 799.
12. See id.
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presenting new evidence concerning the extent of her injuries.13 At the
hearing, Cleveland's doctors classified her as 100% disabled. 14 On Sep-
tember 29, 1995, "[tlhe S[ocial] S[ecurity] A[dministration] awarded
Cleveland SSDI benefits retroactive to the day of her stroke." 15
On September 22, 1995, the week before her SSDI award, Cleveland
brought suit against Policy Management Systems under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of. Texas. 16 She claimed her employer fired her with-
out trying to accommodate for her current condition.17 Cleveland al-
leged that her requests for additional time and training were denied by
Policy Management Systems.' 8 The district court did not evaluate her
claim on the merits, but rather granted summary judgment in favor of
Policy Management Systems.1 9 The district court held that Cleveland
had "conceded" that her current condition was that of someone
"totally disabled" due to the fact she had applied for and received SSDI
benefits.20 Cleveland had essentially negated any potential ADA claim
by stating that she could not "perform the essential functions" of her
job.21
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment, holding that "the application for or the
receipt of social security disability benefits creat[ed] a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the claimant or recipient of such benefits [was] judicially
estopped from asserting that he [or she was] a 'qualified individual with
a disability.' 22 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that it
was "at least theoretically conceivable that under some limited and
highly unusual set of circumstances the two claims would not necessarily
be mutually exclusive." 23 However, the court of appeals concluded that
13. See id.
14. See Respondents' Brief at 5-6, Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795
(1999) (No. 97-1008).
15. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 799.
16. See Respondents' Brief at 1, Cleveland (No. 97-1008).
17. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 799.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. Id.
21. Id. The ADA states that "consideration shall be given to the employer's judgment as to what
functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description before
advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the
essential functions of the job." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994). "Reasonable accommodation" may
include "job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position,
acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and
other similar accommodations ...." 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(9)(B).
22. Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 120 F.3d 513, 518-19 (5th Cir. 1997), vacated,
526 U.S. 795 (1999).
23. Id. at 517.
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Cleveland had consistently represented to the Social Security Ad-
ministration that she was totally disabled.24 Therefore, Cleveland had not
raised a genuine issue of material fact concerning her status as totally
disabled, thus estopping her from pursuing an ADA claim as a "quali-
fied individual with a disability." 25
Cleveland appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which
granted certiorari to resolve the varying positions the circuits had taken
regarding the interrelation of ADA and SSDI claims. 26 The Court held
that "pursuit, and receipt, of SSDI benefits does not automatically estop
a recipient from pursuing an ADA claim [or raise] a strong presumption
against the recipient's [claim.]" 27
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In order to fully appreciate the impact of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp.,28 it is
necessary to know some of the history concerning this area of law. The
ADA and Social Security Act (SSA) are based on different sets of
assumptions regarding disabled individuals and the nature of disabili-
ties.29 In recent years, courts have struggled to reconcile these two laws,
leading to contradictory opinions as to how, or even whether, a prior
SSA claim affects a plaintiff's ADA claim.30
A. THE PUBLIC POLICY BEHIND THE SSA AND THE ADA
The SSA and the ADA both assist individuals with disabilities, but
they do so in different ways.31 Congress established the disability pro-
visions of the SSA in 1956, which are administered by the Social Securi-
ty Administration. 32 The disability provisions of the SSA are designed
to provide certain disabled individuals with benefits that, while not based
24. See id. at 518.
25. Id. at 519. The Fifth Circuit ruled that "on the facts before [it]," Cleveland could not rebut
her "unambiguous" and "uncontroverted" representations to the Social Security Administration and,
therefore, was not a qualified individual with a disability. Id. The Fifth' Circuit wrote "[t]o permit
Cleveland to make such an argument in the face of her prior, consistent, and-until now-uncontested
sworn representations to the S[ocial] S[ecurity] A[ct] would be tantamount to condoning her
advancement of entirely inconsistent positions, a factual impossibility and a legal contradiction." Id.
26. See Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 800 (1999).
27. Id. at 797-98.
28. 526 U.S. 795 (1999).
29. See Matthew Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies: The Tensions Between the Americans with
Disabilities Act and Federal Disability Benefit Programs, 76 Tax. L. REv. 1003, 1006 (1998).
30. See Rascon v. U S West Communications, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324, 1330-32 (10th Cir. 1998)
(explaining the split in the various United States Courts of Appeals which have dealt with the issue).
31. See Diller, supra note 29, at 1005-06 (stating that the SSA provides "income support" for
disabled persons while the ADA provides assistance to integrate disabled persons into the workforce).
32. See Diller, supra note 29, at 1005.
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on need, are intended to compensate them for lost income or to protect
them from indigence. 33 The SSA provides that an insured individual has
a "disability" and is entitled to benefits when the individual is unable to
engage in "substantial gainful activity" because of a "physical or men-
tal impairment" that is expected to result in death or that has lasted, or
can be expected to last, for twelve months or more. 34 The impairment
must be "of such severity that the insured is not only unable to do his
[or her] previous work but cannot, considering his or her age, education,
and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful
work which exists in the national economy." 35
SSDI benefits are based upon the idea that a medical condition
prohibits an individual from working, not that any social barriers are in
place to impair the individual's ability to work.36 Congress passed these
programs on the premise that people with disabilities "should be exempt
from the obligation to work [which] society imposes on its members." 37
In contrast to the SSA, the ADA looks at the concept of disability very
differently and has a very different emphasis. 38
The purpose of the ADA is to "eradicate widespread discrimination
against individuals with disabilities and, among other things, to enable
disabled people to move off the government benefit rolls and return to
work." 39 The ADA was seen by many as an extension of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973,40 which offered protections to disabled individuals who
worked in federally funded programs or activities. 41 Congress created
33. See H.R. REP. No. 1189, at 4-5 (1955); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 340-41
n.24 (1976).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(D), 423(d)(1)(A) (1994). The SSA states that in determining eligibili-
ty, "the Commissioner of Social Security shall consider the combined effect of all of the individual's
impairments without regard to whether any [single] impairment, if considered separately, would be of
[sufficient] severity." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). "[Work which exists in the national economy means work which
exists in significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of
the country." Id.
36. See Diller, supra note 29, at 1005-06.
37. Diller, supra note 29, at 1006.
38. See Diller, supra note 29, at 1006 ("[S]ocial resources should be devoted to integrating peo-
ple with disabilities into the work force ....").
39. Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Cleveland v.
Policy Management Sys. Corp. at 7, 526 U.S. 795 (1999) (No. 97-1008). The ADA is extremely broad
in scope, covering discrimination in the areas of employment, public services, and public accom-
modations. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12213 (1994). However, Cleveland only dealt with
Title I of the ADA, which covers employment discrimination. See 526 U.S. at 798.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
41. See Reed L. Russell, Arguing For More Principled Decision Making in Deciding Whether an
Individual is Substantially Limited in the Major Life Activity of Working Under the ADA, 47 CAVm. U. L.
REV. 1057, 1057 (1998). The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 "prohibit[ed] discrimination based on
disability by any program receiving federal financial assistance, any executive agency, and the United
States Postal Service." Id. at 1057 n.2 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794). The Rehabilitation Act "also extended
protection to federal employees and employees of federal contractors." Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 791,
793 (1994)).
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the ADA to compensate persons with disabilities for the barriers society
places in their paths. 42 To this end, the ADA prohibits employers from
discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability on the basis
of the disability. 43 A "qualified individual with a disability" is "an
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accom-
modation, can perform the essential functions" of his or her job.44 The
ADA defines "disability" as: "(A) a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an]
individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as
having such an impairment." 45
The ADA allows individuals with disabilities the opportunity to
partake in everyday life as much as possible through the removal of
barriers. 46 "At the time of its enactment in 1990, the ADA was widely
hailed as establishing a new foundation for disability policy." 47 The
ADA assumed that simply because a person had a disability, this did not
make the individual unable to work, and the investment of "social re-
sources" to allow easier access to the workplace would be appropriate. 48
The enactment of the ADA was not accompanied by amendments to
the SSA. 49 The ADA contains nearly no mention of other disability
benefit programs. 50 Consequently, two main disability policies exist, the
ADA and the SSA, based upon differing views of what a disability is and
how to compensate for disabilities. 51 The traditional approach equated a
disability with the total inability to work, 52 while the modem view
focused upon the removal of barriers which served to prevent people
with disabilities from working. 53 Because of this, the federal courts of
42. See McNeill v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 878 F. Supp. 986, 991 (S.D. Tex.
1995).
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The Rehabilitation Act states that -[nlo covered entity shall
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation,
job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." Id. "Covered entity" is
defined as "an employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management
committee." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2).
44. 42U.S.C. § 12111(8).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C) (1994).
46. See Diller, supra note 29, at 1004.
47. Diller, supra note 29, at 1004. Senator Harkin, the ADA's primary sponsor, called it "the
20th century Emancipation Proclamation for all persons with disabilities." Diller, supra note 29, at
1004 (citing 136 CoN. Rec. S9689 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin)). "President
Bush predicted that the ADA would 'open all aspects of American life to individuals with disabilities'
and end the 'unjustified segregation of and exclusion of persons with disabilities from the mainstream
of American life."' Diller, supra note 29, at 1004.
48. See Diller, supra note 29, at 1005.
49. See Diller, supra note 29, at 1006.
50. See Diller, supra note 29, at 1006.
51. See Diller, supra note 29, at 1006.
52. See Diller, supra note 29, at 1006.
53. See Diller, supra note 29, at 1006.
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appeals have had some difficulty reconciling the two statutes, resulting in
a conflict in the various circuits,5 4 which the Supreme Court finally
addressed in Cleveland.55
B. THE SPLIT IN THE CIRCUITS
Prior to Cleveland, the federal courts of appeals were divided on
whether some form of judicial estoppel should be adopted in the context
of an ADA plaintiff's claim.5 6 However, "the circuits [did] not align
themselves on either side of a neatly drawn line." 57 Instead, "the
varying approaches to the issue lie along a continuum." 58
At one end of the continuum was the theory used in McNemar v.
Disney Store, Inc.,59 in which the Third Circuit Court of Appeals "held
that a plaintiff . . . who claimed an inability to work for purposes of
collecting disability benefits was estopped from arguing he [was] a
'qualified individual with a disability' under the ADA."60 Further
along this continuum was the position adopted by the Fifth Circuit in
Cleveland which held that a rebuttable presumption was created barring
a plaintiff from filing an ADA claim when the plaintiff was receiving
SSDI benefits. 6 1 Finally, at the other end of this continuum was the
approach adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Rascon v. U S West Commu-
nications, Inc.,62 which rejected the doctrine of judicial estoppel and de-
clined to apply any kind of presumption against the plaintiff.63
54. See Diller, supra note 29, at 1007.
55. See generally Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999).
56. See Rascon v. U S West Communications, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324, 1332 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding
that application for, or receipt of, SSDI benefits is relevant to, but does not estop plaintiff from
bringing, an ADA claim); McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 618-20 (3d Cir. 1996)
(applying judicial estoppel to bar a plaintiff from bringing suit under the ADA); Kennedy v. Applause,
Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481-82 (9th Cir. 1996) (declining to apply judicial estoppel but holding that
claimant who declared total disability in a benefits application failed to raise a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether she was a qualified individual with a disability).
57. Rascon, 143 F.3d at 1330-32 (explaining the nature of the split in the circuits).
58. Id.
59. 91 F.3d 610, 618-20 (3d Cit. 1996).
60. McNemar, 91 F.3d at 618-20. In McNemar, the plaintiff suffered from AIDS. See id. at 613.
He was terminated from his job for not returning two dollars he had taken from the cash register. See
id. After losing his job, he applied for, and received, SSDI benefits. See id. at 615.. He also filed an
ADA suit against his employer, claiming the stated grounds for his termination were pretextual, and
that he was really fired because of his medical condition. See id. at 616.
61. See Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 120 F.3d 513, 518-19 (5th Cir. 1997),
vacated, 526 U.S. 795 (1999).
62. 143 F.3d 1324 (10th Cir. 1998).
63. See Rascon v. U S West Communications, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324, 1332 (10th Cir. 1998). In
Rascon, the plaintiff suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder caused by his experiences in the
Vietnam War. See id. at 1326. U S West fired him from his position as a network technician. See id.
at 1329. The plaintiff applied for, and received, SSDI benefits. See id. He then brought suit against
U S West under the ADA. See id.
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Judicial estoppel is a doctrine based on fundamental fairness. 64 It
applies when: (1) two different positions are taken by the same party,
(2) the first position was taken in a judicial or quasi-judicial admini-
strative proceeding, (3) the party to be estopped intended for the trier of
fact in the first proceeding to accept the first position, and (4) the two
positions are totally inconsistent. 65 The purpose of the judicial estoppel
doctrine is to "preserve the integrity of the judicial system by preventing
parties from 'asserting a position in this proceeding inconsistent with the
one they previously asserted."' 66
In applying the doctrine, the Third Circuit, in McNemar, used a
two-part inquiry. 67 First, the court asked if the party's present position
was inconsistent with a position formerly asserted. 68 If so, the court then
asked if the party "assert[ed] either or both of the inconsistent positions
in bad faith, [that is,] 'with intent to play fast and loose' with the
court." 69 The court in McNemar found that the plaintiff clearly asserted
inconsistent positions. 70 The plaintiff represented to one federal agency
and two state agencies that he was unable to work, while also stating he
was "a qualified person with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, could perform the essential functions of a job."7 1
Therefore, the Third Circuit decided the plaintiff should be judicially
estopped from "speak[ing] out of both sides of [his] mouth with equal
vigor and credibility before [the] court." 72 The Second and Ninth
Circuits seemed to favor the approach used by the Third Circuit in
McNemar.73
Accordingly, those circuits applying judicial estoppel assumed a
plaintiff could apply for SSDI benefits or ADA benefits, but not for
64. See Rissetto v. Plumbers and Steam Fitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing
Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1990) (explaining the doctrine of judicial estoppel as an
"equitable doctrine")).
65. See id.
66. McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 617 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Delgrosso v. Spang
& Co., 903 F.2d 234, 241 (3d Cit. 1990)).
67. Seeid. at 618.
68. See id.
69. Id. (citing Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 361 (3d Cit.
1996) (applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel in the context of bankruptcy proceedings)).
70. See id.
71. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a) (1994)).
72. Id. (quoting Reigel v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 859 F. Supp. 963, 970 (E.D.N.C. 1994)).
73. See Simon v. Safelite Glass Corp., 128 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1997) (applying judicial estoppel in
an age discrirmination case but stating that the applicability of judicial estoppel to ADA cases would be
left for another day); Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481-82 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that
the plaintiff, who made sworn statements of total disability in a social security disability application and
then testified at her deposition that she was not totally disabled, failed to raise a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether she was a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of the
ADA).
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both. 74 "[I]n many of these cases, judges appear[ed] angered by the
attempts of disability .... claimants to seek work." 75 The courts treated
the plaintiff as dishonest and "view[ed] attempts to rely on both statuto-
ry schemes as . . . 'double-dipping."' 76
Further along the continuum was the approach adopted by the Fifth
Circuit in Cleveland.77 Under this view, the application for, or receipt of,
disability benefits does not automatically estop the plaintiff from bring-
ing an ADA claim.78 However, the SSA claim creates a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the plaintiff is judicially estopped from bringing an ADA
claim.79
At the other end of the continuum was the approach adopted by the
Tenth Circuit in Rascon, which rejected the theory of judicial estoppel
and rejected creating any kind of presumptions against the plaintiff.80
In Rascon, the Tenth Circuit held that "statements made in connection
with an application for social security disability benefits [would] not be
an automatic bar to a disability discrimination claim under the ADA."81
However, such statements may be used as evidence to determine whether
a plaintiff was a "qualified individual with a disability."82 The Tenth
Circuit disagreed with the Third Circuit's analyis because the ADA also
considered the individual's ability to work "given reasonable accom-
modation" while the SSA makes no consideration of accommodations.8 3
Therefore, statements made to support an application for SSDI bene-
.fits are not automatically inconsistent with statements made to further an
ADA claim because the issue of accommodations is not considered in
determining eligibility for SSDI benefits.84 Joining the Tenth Circuit in
74. See Diller, supra note 29, at 1033-34.
75. Diller, supra note 29, at 1034-35. The author quoted from one lower court case, "[lit is
logically impossible for an individual to be sufficiently 'disabled' to qualify for long-term disability
benefits yet nonetheless be capable of 'perform[ing] the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds' ... simply stated, these two statutes are incompatible." Diller,
supra note 29, at 1033-35 (quoting Cline v. Western Horseman Inc., 922 F. Supp. 442, 446 (D. Colo.
1996) (holding that the plaintiff, who had been employed by the defendant as a clerk, was estopped
from raising an ADA claim because of her prior receipt of numerous disability benefits (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994)))).
76. Diller, supra note 29, at 1035.
77. See Rascon v. U S West Communications, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324, 1331 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing
Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 120 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 1997), vacated, 526 U.S. 795
(1999)).
78. See Cleveland, 120 F.3d at 518.
79. See id.
80. See Rascon, 143 F.3d at 1332 (refusing to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel against a
plaintiff who suffered post-traumatic stress disorder and was fired from his position as a network
technician).
81. Id.
82. Id
83. Id. at 1330-31.
84. See id. at 1331.
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this view were the Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, as well as, the
District of Columbia Circuit.8 5 The only other circuit to address the
issue was the Eighth Circuit, which declared it had not yet "firmly
entrenched itself within any of the camps of divergent opinions on this
issue."86
Based on the divergence of views among the federal courts of
appeals, there was obviously much confusion over what effect, if any, a
prior SSA claim should have on an ADA claim.8 7 In order to settle the
question, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Cleveland and ad-
dressed the issue directly.88
III. ANALYSIS
In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Breyer, the Supreme
Court held that despite the appearance of conflict that arises from the
language of the ADA and SSDI statutes, "the two claims do not
inherently conflict [so much that] courts should apply a special negative
presumption like the one" which the Fifth Circuit applied.89 There are
too many situations where an SSDI claim can legitimately co-exist with
an ADA claim.90
Policy Management Systems argued that Cleveland could not
establish a prima facie case under the ADA because she could not show
that she was a qualified individual with a disability. 91 Because Cleveland
and her doctors had consistently and repeatedly described her as
completely disabled, Policy Management Systems argued that the district
court was correct in ruling that Cleveland could not simultaneously and
85. See id. (citing Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 135 F.3d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1998) (agreeing
with the opinion of the D.C. Circuit that receipt of disability benefits does not preclude subsequent
ADA relief, and therefore judicial estoppel is not appropriate, but that a plaintiff's prior sworn
statements may be considered as a material factor); Talavera v. School Bd., 129 F.3d 1214, 1220 (1 lth
Cir. 1997) (holding that a plaintiff, whose position as a secretary for a school board was not renewed,
was not barred from bringing ADA action merely because she had claimed a total disability in her
application for disability benefits); Weigel v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating
that the granting of disability benefits is not determinative as to whether or not one is a qualified
individual under the ADA); Swanks v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582, 586 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (holding that receipt of disability benefits does not preclude subsequent ADA relief for a
plaintiff who suffered from a spinal abnormality and was fired from his position as a special police
officer)).
86. Dush v. Appleton Elec. Co., 124 F.3d 957, 962 n.8 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that it was not
necessary for the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals to take a position on judicial estoppel).
87. See Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 800 (1999).
88. See id.
89. Id. at 802.
90. See id. at 802-03.
91. See Respondents' Brief at 34-35, Cleveland (No. 97-1008).
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inconsistently seek the protection of the ADA.92 However, the Supreme
Court disagreed with this argument.93
The Court noted "the ADA defines a 'qualified individual' to
include a disabled person 'who ... can perform the essential functions'
of her job 'with reasonable accommodation."' 94 In contrast, the Social
Security Administration does not look to the possibility of "reasonable
accommodations" when determining eligibility for SSDI benefits.95 In
fact, the Court stated that an applicant need not even "refer to the
possibility of reasonable accommodation when [he or she] applies for
SSDI."96 This omission reflects the fact that the Social Security Admini-
stration receives over two and a half million claims for disability benefits
every year and has limited administrative resources.97 The Court wrote
that the issue of "'reasonable accommodation' may turn on highly
disputed workplace-specific matters, and a Social Security Admini-
stration misjudgment about that ...matter would deprive a seriously
disabled person of the critical financial support the statute seeks to
provide." 98 Thus, an ADA claim alleging a plaintiff could perform her
job with reasonable accommodations could be consistent with an SSDI
claim that without reasonable accommodations the plaintiff could not
perform her job or another job.99
The Court explained that a five-step process is used to determine
eligibility for SSDI benefits.lOO The process is based upon assumptions
concerning disabilities which are not consistent with ADA views but are
essential to ensure some sense of efficiency within the Social Security
92. See id.
93. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 802 (explaining an SSA representation of total disability often
implies a context-related legal conclusion).
94. Id. at 803.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Diller, supra note 29, at 1005. SSDI and Supplemental Security Income together cost
approximately $60 billion a year and provide support to approximately 7.5 million people. See Diller,
supra note 29, at 1005. The disability determination process costs approximately $2.5 billion a year.
See Diller, supra note 29, at 1016.
98. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 803.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 804. The five-step procedure consists of five questions:
1. Are you presently working? (If so, you are ineligible.)
2. Do you have a "severe impairment," i.e., one that "significantly limits" your ability to
do basic work activities? (If not, you are ineligible.)
3. Does your impairment "mee[t]or equa[l]" an impairment on a specific ... SSA list?
(If so, you are eligible without more.)
4. If your impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, can you perform your
"past relevant work?" (If so, you are ineligible.)
5. If your impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment and you cannot
perform your "past relevant work," then can you perform other jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy? (If not; you are eligible).
Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(f), .1525, .1526, .1560(c) (1999)).
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Administration. 101 However, "they inevitably simplify [the situation,]
eliminating consideration of many differences potentially relevant to an
individual's ability to perform a particular job."102 Thus, due to special
individual circumstances, an individual could qualify for SSDI under the
SSA's administrative rules and still remain capable of performing the
essential functions of his or her job under the ADA.103
The Court also pointed out that the Social Security Administration
may allow SSDI benefits to be given to employed individuals.104 For
example, to aid a disabled individual in returning to work, the SSA
allows a nine-month trial-work period during which SSDI recipients can
still receive full benefits.105 The SSDI benefits may not be terminated
even when an individual's situation improves to the point which allows
the individual's full-time return to work.106 The Court stated that
because of the varying degree of impact a disability may have on an
individual at any given time, the application for, or receipt of, SSDI
benefits may not accurately reflect an individual's capacity at a
subsequent point in time, namely when an ADA claim is filed.107
Finally, the Court noted that "if an individual has merely applied
for, but has not been awarded, SSDI benefits, any inconsistency in the
theory of the claims is of the sort normally tolerated by our legal
system." 108 Ordinary rules of procedure allow parties to bring forth
alternative theories; thus, parties are allowed to "set forth two or more
statements of a claim or defense alternately or hypothetically" and to
"state as many separate claims or defenses as the party has regardless of
consistency."1 09 The Court did not think that the law should be any
different with respect to the assertion of SSDI and ADA claims. 110 In
light of these facts, the Court held that it would not apply "any special
legal presumption permitting someone who has applied for, or received,
SSDI benefits to bring an ADA suit only in 'some limited and highly
unusual set of circumstances."' 11
Nevertheless, the Court acknowledged that there may be some
situations when an SSDI claim and an ADA claim would not be able to
101. See id.
102. Id.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 805.
105. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 422(c), 423(e)(1) (1994); 20 C.F.R § 404.1592 (1999)).
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2)).
110. See id.
111. Id. (quoting Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 120 F.3d 513, 517 (5th Cir. 1997),
vacated, 526 U.S. 795 (1999)).
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co-exist. 112 Thus, if a plaintiff were unable to prove an essential element
of an ADA claim because of a genuine conflict with a previous claim,
summary judgment would be proper. 113 ADA plaintiffs bear the burden
of proving they are "qualified individuals with a disability," in other
words, individuals "who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions" of their jobs.114 Sworn assertions by
plaintiffs, in an application for disability benefits, that they are "unable
to work", would seem to negate an essential element of their ADA case,
at least if they do not offer a sufficient explanation. 115 For this reason,
the Court held that ADA plaintiffs cannot simply ignore any apparent
contradiction that arises, but rather must give a sufficient explanation.' 1 6
The Court indicated that lower courts had found a similar need for
explanation."l 7 The lower courts have almost unanimously held that if
previous statements made by a plaintiff seemingly contradict the current
claim, the plaintiff must attempt to explain or resolve the dispute in order
to survive summary judgment."18 Although those lower court decisions
involved contradictions of fact, the Court believed a similar insistence
upon explanation was warranted when the conflict involves a legal
conclusion, as in this case.119 The Court stated that "[w]hen faced with a
plaintiff's previous sworn statement asserting 'total disability,' . . . [a]
court should require an explanation of any apparent inconsistency with
the necessary elements of an ADA claim." 120 In order to survive sum-
112. See id.
113. See id. at 805-06 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).
114. Id. at 806 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994)).
115. Id
116. See id.
117. See id
118. See id. (citing Rule v. Brine, Inc., 85 F.3d 1002, 1011 (2d Cir. 1996) (denying a motion for
summary judgment in a breach of contract claim when the plaintiffs subsequent sworn testimony
amplified, and did not merely contradict, his prior testimony); Colantuoni v. Alfred Calcagni & Sons,
Inc., 44 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1994) (granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant in negligence
action when the plaintiffs prior sworn testimony conflicted with an affidavit he submitted); Slowiak v.
Land O'Lakes, Inc., 987 F.2d 1293, 1297 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a plaintiff's contradictory
affidavits did not create a genuine issue of material fact); Sinskey v. Pharmacia Ophthalmics, Inc., 982
F.2d 494, 498 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir. 1991);
Hackman v. Valley Fair, 932 F.2d 239, 241 (3d Cir. 1991) (granting summary judgment in favor of the
defendant when the plaintiff's affidavit contradicted his earlier deposition testimony); Pyramid Sec.
Ltd. v. IB Resolution, Inc., 924 F.2d 1114, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (granting summary judgment in the
context of a RICO claim); Davidson & Jones Dev. Co. v. Elmore Dev. Co., 921 F.2d 1343, 1352 (6th
Cit. 1991); Tippens v. Celotex Corp.. 805 F.2d 949, 953-54 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding summary
judgment inappropriate when the affidavit was not inherently inconsistent with affiant's deposition
testimony); Franks v. Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230, 1237 (10th Cir. 1986); Albertson v. TJ. Stevenson & Co.,
749 F.2d 223, 228 (5th Cit. 1984); Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 960 (4th Cir. 1984);
Camfield Tires, Inc. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 719 F.2d 1361, 1365-66 (8th Cir. 1983) (stating that a
party should not be allowed to create contradictions of fact by contradicting his own earlier
testimony)).
119. See id. at 807.
120. Id
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mary judgment, a plaintiff must show that the previous statements were
made with the belief that the plaintiff's situation warranted disability
benefits and that the plaintiff was not so disabled as to preclude
employment with the proper reasonable accommodation.121
By rejecting a theory of judicial estoppel or any kind of heightened
burden of proof in an ADA case, the Supreme Court, in effect, stated that
it would treat ADA claims just as it would treat any other claim. 122 The
Court did not find anything extraordinary about ADA claims; thus, the
ordinary rules of procedure should still apply. 123 Therefore, plaintiffs
who have applied for SSDI benefits will still have the protections of the
ADA.124
IV. IMPACT
Between the time the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Cleve-
land and the time of the Supreme Court's opinion, not a single plaintiff
was successful in the Fifth Circuit in an ADA claim. 125 However, the
Cleveland opinion already seems to have had an impact on ADA law,
and cases since Cleveland indicate that plaintiffs are faring somewhat
better.126 Now, it looks as if more plaintiffs will be able to get beyond
the summary judgment stage and have the merits of their case heard in
court. 127 To be sure, plaintiffs still must explain inconsistencies, and
they will lose if they fail to offer sufficient explanation.128 However,
ADA plaintiffs will not have to satisfy a higher burden of proof than
plaintiffs in ordinary lawsuits.129
Cleveland left unanswered the issue of whether the doctrine of
judicial estoppel might be appropriate in some other context. 130 For
121. See id.
122. See id. at 805.
123. See id
124. See id
125. See, e.g., Pena v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 154 F.3d 267, 269 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding
against an ADA plaintiff); McConathy v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Corp., 131 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir.
1998) (affirming district court's grant of summary judgment against an ADA plaintiff).
126. See Gibson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 182 F.3d 917 (unpublished table decision), 1999 U.S.
App. LEXIS 15180, at *12 (6th Cir. 1999); Giles v. General Elec., No. CIVA 3-97-CV-2774-14, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9369, at *3 (N.D. Tex. June 9. 1999) (reversing summary judgment against ADA
plaintiffs in light of Cleveland). But see Lamb v. Bell County Coal Corp., 188 F.3d 508 (unpublished
table decision), 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 22201, at *1 (6th Cir. 1999); Moore v. Payless Shoe Source,
Inc., 187 F.3d 845, 853 (8th Cir. 1999) (upholding summary judgment against ADA plaintiffs under the
Cleveland rule).
127. See Gibson, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 15180, at *9-*10 (vacating district court's grant of
summary judgment against an ADA plaintiff).
128. See id
129. See id
130. See Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 802 (1999) (explaining the
Court was only considering one specific way in which the SSA and ADA might interact, and was not
addressing the interaction of other statutes).
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example, railroads and their employees are not covered by the SSA; but
rather, they are covered by the Railroad Retirement System (RRS), which
is similar to Social Security but differs in some important ways.131
Railroad employees who are unable to work at any regular employment
may qualify for total and permanent disability benefits, and in evaluating
eligibility for such benefits it is accepted practice to rely on the
regulations of the Social Security Administration.132 Thus, a railroad
worker who is injured on the job may qualify for benefits under both
RRS133 and the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA). 134 A plaintiff
in a FELA claim may not work during the time it takes his or her claim
to go through the trial process but may later attempt to be reinstated. 135
The attempt to return to work sometimes occurs after the plaintiff has
applied for and received disability benefits.136
This situation creates a conflict similar to that which existed in
Cleveland.137 The logic of the Supreme Court's opinion would seem to
apply in this case just as it would in an SSDI setting, but the Court never
addressed this example. 138 It could be that because the RRS and FELA
serve very different purposes than SSDI, the doctrine of judicial estoppel
might be appropriate in FELA cases and inappropriate in ADA cases. 139
Prior to the decision in Cleveland, the courts had sustained the railroad's
position that the plaintiff was judicially estopped from reclaiming his or
her prior job.140 Now, at the very least, it appears that this area of the law
has become unsettled.141
Another question left unanswered by the Court is what impact a tort
lawsuit by the employee against the employer might have.142 For
example, instead of pursuing benefits under the SSA, a plaintiff could
pursue tort compensation and claim in a tort lawsuit that he or she was
permanently disabled and prevented from returning to work. 143 The
131. See Brief for the Association of American Railroads at 2. Cleveland (No. 97-1008).
132. See id. at 2-3.
133. See id. at 3.
134. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994).
135. See Brief for the Association of American Railroads at 4-5, Cleveland (No. 97-1008)
(explaining the public policy behind FELA).
136. See id. at 5.
137. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 797-802.
138. See id. at 802 (stating that the Court was not addressing how the ADA interacts with FELA).
139. See Brief for the Association of American Railroads at 6-8, Cleveland (No. 97-1008) (ar-
guing in favor of the doctrine of judicial estoppel).
140. See id. at 8 (citing Lewandowski v. National R.R. Passengers Corp., 882 F.2d 815 (3d Cir.
1989); Morawa v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 819 F.2d 289 (6th Cir. 1987)).
141. See id
142. See generally Cleveland, 526 U.S. 795.
143. See Brief for the Association of American Railroads at 14-15, Cleveland (No. 97-1008)
(stating that when judicial estoppel is not imposed, a plaintiff could possibly receive future lost wages
in a lump-sum payment and also be reinstated at the job for which he or she had received the payment
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Court's decision leaves unanswered the question of whether a plaintiff
should be judicially estopped from bringing an ADA claim when a tort
action had been initiated. 144 The logic in Cleveland would again seem to
apply, in which case estoppel would be inappropriate. 145 However, if the
context of the statement is the key factor to the Court, then estoppel
might be appropriate, because claiming that one is disabled in a tort
lawsuit could mean something very different than the same claim would
mean in an SSA context. 146 The Court's reliance on the context of a
plaintiff's statement creates a host of new questions.147 For example,
disability could mean one thing in a tort lawsuit, and something else in
an SSA application, and still something else in a FELA claim.148 It
remains to be seen whether the Court will make distinctions in these
separate areas of the law. It is also unclear how the Court could justify
any distinctions based on the context of the claim. 149 The Court in
Cleveland did indicate that it was reluctant to subject plaintiffs to a
heightened burden of proof standard except in unusual circum-
stances. 150 Given this fact, it seems unlikely that the Court will apply the
doctrine of judicial estoppel in ADA cases, regardless of the context.
The Court also did not express any views on how, or whether,
Congress should modify the SSA or the ADA to prevent these types of
contradictions from occurring.151 Critics have called for Congress to
enter the field and reconcile any inconsistencies that exist between the
two Acts. 152 By recognizing that the two programs overlap, the Court
seemed to believe that any inconsistencies could effectively be dealt with
at trial, without the need for Congress to step in and change the law.153
In one sense, the Supreme Court's decision in Cleveland was fairly
unremarkable. Cleveland established that statements made in connection
with a benefits application could be considered as evidence in a subse-
quent ADA action, and the fact-finder could determine the appropriate
weight to be given the statements. 154 In essence, the Court said that ADA
for future lost wages).
144. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 802 (stressing that the Court was only deciding the question of
how the ADA and SSA interact in one specific context).
145. See id. (explaining why the doctrine of judicial estoppel is not usually appropriate).
146. See id. (stating that disability under the SSA implies a context-related legal conclusion).
147. See generally Brief for the Association of American Railroads, Cleveland (No. 97-1008)
(listing some of the ways in which the ADA may conflict with other areas of the law).
148. See id at 16 (stating that there is no specific definition of disability under FELA, but that
disability is precisely defined by SSA regulations).
149. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 802 (refusing to address how the ADA might conflict with stat-
utes other than SSA).
150. See id. at 805 (indicating that judicial estoppel should only apply in extraordinary
circumstances).
151. See generally id (declining to call upon Congress.to reconcile the ADA and SSA).
152. See Diller, supra note 29, at 1067 (recommending Congressional action in this area).
153. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 805.
154. See id. at 806.
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cases will proceed under the same standards as most ordinary lawsuits do,
and there is nothing special about ADA suits which warrants either a per
se bar or a heightened evidentiary standard on the plaintiff. 5 5 Under
this decision, the ADA is now available to protect and assist people with
disabilities even if they have been granted SSDI benefits.1 56 Plaintiffs
will not have to choose between benefits they may need immediately and
a more complete remedy under the ADA.157
V. CONCLUSION
In rejecting the theory of judicial estoppel, the Court in Cleveland
recognized that there is no inherent contradiction between the idea that
some individuals should receive income support because of their disabil-
ities and the notion that society should remove obstacles faced by
disabled people in the workplace. 158 Supplemental income goals and
equal treatment goals can co-exist in a "comprehensive disability poli-
cy." 159 However, the differing assumptions these two goals are based
upon create the current "tension in disability law."160 While Cleveland
is a major step toward a comprehensive disability policy, the manner in
which these tensions are resolved will be the determining factor in
whether the ADA becomes the society changing legislation its creators
intended. 161
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155. See id. at 805-06.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See Diller, supra note 29, at 1006.
159. Diller, supra note 29, at 1006-07.
160. Diller, supra note 29, at 1007.
161. See Diller, supra note 29, at 1007.
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